完善生态伦理学的合理论证  

Bettered Ecological Ethics: Its Reasonable Arguments

作　　者：佘正荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]中共广东省委党校哲学教研部,广东广州510050

出　　处：《深圳大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2007年第5期32-39,共8页Journal of Shenzhen University：Humanities & Social Sciences

基　　金：广东省哲学社会科学2006年度一般项目"人类在生命共同体中的道德义务"(06C09)

摘　　要：从"是"直接推出"应该"是生态伦理学论证面临的一个理论难题。但通过吸纳社会领域消解事实与价值绝对二分的合理主张,并根据人类生态实践而扩展道德论证的可合理接受性标准,在分析生命共同体中事实与价值的复杂关系的基础上,创设一种非线性思维的综合论述的证明方式,而不是沿用传统的演绎模型的证明方式,就既可以避免"自然主义谬误,"又能够对生态伦理学做出一种非逻辑形式的合理论证。To deduce ＂ought to be＂ from ＂to be＂ has been a theoretical dilemma confronted by the justification of ecological ethics. But by absorbing the reasonable viewpoint of eliminating the fact/value dichotomy, going in line with the standard of rational acceptability extended by humans＂ ecological practice and being based on the analysis of the complex relations of fact and value in life community, rather than by following the traditional deductive model of justification we can create a way of justification with nonlinear thinking and integrative arguments, , and thus we can not only avoid ＂the naturalistic fallacy＂, but also put forward a non- logical justification for ecological ethics.

关 键 词：生态伦理学 自然主义谬误 生命共同体 非逻辑形式论证 

分 类 号：B82-058[哲学宗教—伦理学]