价值判断不可证实吗?——对逻辑实证主义等关于价值判断理论的批判  

Can Value Judgment Be Verified?——Criticism on the Value Judgment Theory of Logical Positivism

作　　者：陈郭华[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学,上海200433

出　　处：《云南大学学报（社会科学版）》2007年第5期47-56,65,共11页The Journal of Yunnan University:Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：20世纪初,以逻辑实证主义为代表的现代哲学家通过对逻辑数学命题和自然科学命题的分析研究,提出了可证实性原则,根据这一可证实性原则,他们认为包括伦理道德判断在内的价值判断是一种没有真假意义的陈述,因为它们具有不可证实性。本文从逻辑实证主义的"价值判断是不可证实的"这一论断的提出及其论证理由入手,检讨逻辑实证主义等关于价值判断是不可证实的这一理论的合理性,以重新确立对寻求价值判断意义和有效性的信心。At the beginning of the 20th century and through a study of the propositions of logical mathematics and the propositions of natural sciences,modern philosophers with logical positivists as the representatives brought up the principle of verification.With this,they have concluded that all value judgments,including ethic judgment,are statements of neutrality because of their unverifiable nature.This paper traces the origin of this theory and discusses its rationality in order to reestablish the confidence in pursuing the significance and validity of value judgment.

关 键 词：价值判断 可证实性 情感 语言 理性 

分 类 号：B085[哲学宗教—哲学理论]