民营金字塔企业终极所有者融资约束与非效率投资行为研究  

Study on Financing Constraints and Inefficient Investment of Ultimate Owner in Private Pyramid Firms

作　　者：韩志丽[1] 杨淑娥[2] 史浩江[3] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]上海对外贸易学院,上海201600 [3]广东商学院,广东广州510320

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2007年第5期143-148,共6页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672054)

摘　　要：在对金字塔企业终极所有者投资行为进行理论分析的基础上,本文运用我国民营上市公司的非平衡面板数据,考察了民营金字塔企业终极所有者的非效率投资问题。研究发现:在受到融资约束的情况下,终极所有者会发生投资不足的行为;在不受融资约束的情况下,终极所有者出于最大化自身利益的考虑会进行过度投资;而在确保控制权的情况下,终极所有者所持有的现金流权越小,其过度投资越严重;投资者保护环境越差,越有利于终极所有者的过度投资行为。另外,文章运用理论模型探寻了终极所有者隧道挖掘与过度投资之间的关系,研究发现在不受融资约束的情况下二者呈正相关关系。Based on the theoretic analysis of inefficient investment of ultimate owner, the paper analyzes the problem of inefficient investment of ultimate owner in private firms using unbalanced panel data of Chinese private listed firms. The result suggests that ultimate owner will make under-investment facing financing constraints,and he will do over-investment without financing constraints. The smaller of the cash-flow right owned by ultimate owner or the worse protection of investors,the more severe over-investment will be done by ultimate owner. Besides, the paper investigates the relationship between the tunneling and over- investment of ultimate owner and finds the negative correlation without financing constraints.

关 键 词：金字塔结构 终极所有者 融资约束 投资不足 过度投资 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]