逆向物流活动中政府与企业的委托代理问题研究  

Research on Principal-Agent Relationship of Government and Enterprises in Reverse Logistics

作　　者：郭滕达[1] 李向阳[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学技术.政策.管理(TPM)研究中心

出　　处：《哈尔滨工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2007年第6期83-88,共6页Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571019);博士点基金资助项目(20060213004)

摘　　要：基于委托代理理论,研究循环经济下逆向物流活动中政府与企业的行为关系。分析了逆向物流活动中政府与企业存在的信息分享情况,拓展了传统的委托代理模型,认为激励合同的设计应该考虑行为双方对自然状态项不同认识的情况。以参数化例子阐述政府根据企业逆向物流活动设定激励合同的内容。研究结果表明:逆向物流活动中,政府与企业具有委托代理关系,并且存在信息不对称的情况;企业的最优努力水平是成本系数和奖惩因子的比值;政府设定的奖惩因子是成本系数、风险规避量以及自然状态项方差的递减函数;合理的激励合同实施可以使政府和企业明晰各自的成本、收益以及风险。最后论述了该研究对逆向物流活动中政府和企业行为的一些启示。This paper deals with behavior relationship between government and enterprises in reverse logistics under circular economy based on principal - agent theory and analyzes information share situation in reverse logistics between government and enterprises. Traditional principal - agent model is extended, different cognitions of the state of government and enterprises are considered and a parametric example can be used to explain the contents of incentive contract. The research results are as foUws： government and enterprises have principal -agent relationship in reverse logistics, and asymmetrical information situation exists between government and enterprises; enterprise＇s optimal effort level is the ratio of cost coefficient and rewards and punishment factor; the rewards and punishment factor set by government is decreasing function of cost coefficient, risk aversion and variance of the state of the world; the implementing of incentive contract may make government and enterprises clear about their cost, profit and risk. Finally, some useful hints are provided for government and enterprises in reverse logistics.

关 键 词：逆向物流 委托代理 信息不对称 激励合同 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]