企业现金持有量影响因素的实证研究——来自我国上市公司的经验证据  

A Positive Study on the Determinants of Corporate Cash Holdings: The Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies of China

作　　者：杨兴全[1] 孙杰[2] 

机构地区：[1]石河子大学经济贸易学院 [2]新疆财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2007年第6期47-54,共8页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(05CJY008);科技部国家软科学项目(2006GXQ3D170)资助

摘　　要：20世纪90年代末,国外企业出现持有大量现金与现金等价物的现象,为什么企业持有大量的现金与现金等价物,以及企业持有现金的后果等问题,逐步得到国外学者的关注而成为一个研究的热点,国外学者主要从权衡理论、信息不对称理论、公司治理机制,以及投资者的法律保护程度等方面展开现金持有量的研究。由于我国的经济与制度环境同国外有很大差别,我国证券市场的发展处于一个转型时期,内部人控制严重,资本市场还不完善,国外的实证结论直接移植到国内缺乏说服力。上市公司现金持有量的影响因素也逐步得到国内学者的关注,但我国的研究还处于起步阶段。本文在理论分析与文献梳理的基础上,以我国部分上市公司为样本,检验了我国上市公司的特质性因素和公司治理机制对公司现金持有量的影响。研究结果表明,公司现金持有量与财务杠杆、银行性债务、净营运资本负相关,与公司的投资机会正相关,权衡理论和优序融资理论得到了经验支持;国有股、董事会规模、股东保护程度与现金持有量负相关;经营者持股与现金持有量正相关;股权集中度、独立董事、以及领导权结构并没对公司现金持有量产生显著影响。本文从现金持有量的角度为我国上市公司治理的不完善性提供了证据,需要我们从股权结构、董事会特征等方面进一步完善公司治理机制,规范公司的现金持有行为。At the end of 1990s, there is a phenomenon that foreign corporations hold massive cash and the cash equivalent. The reason of holding massive cash and the cash equivalent and the result of holding cash become a hot spot for foreign scholars, they investigate cash holdings mainly from the aspects of tradeoff theory, asymmetric information theory, corporate governance mechanism and investor protection of law. In China, we have different economy and institution environment from overseas, and our stock market is in transition, and the insiders＇ control is serious, and the capital market is imperfect, so the empirical conclusion from overseas can not be used directly. Gradually, the determinants of the listed corporate cash holdings also attract the domestic scholars; however, our research is at the beginning stage. Based on the theory and literature analysis, this paper takes some listed companies in China as sample to investigate the determinants of corporate cash holdings from the special characteristics and corporate governance mechanism. Our study shows that corporate cash holdings has negative relation with leverage, bank debt, net working capital, and positive relation with corporate investment opportunities, the pecking order theory and the tradeoff model are supported; ownership of state, number of directors, and shareholder protection have negative correlation with cash holdings; management ownership has positive correlation with cash holdings; ownership concentration, independent directors and leadership structure have no effect on corporate cash holdings. This paper provides the evidence for imperfect corporate governance of our country from the aspect of cash holdings, which needs us to perfect the corporate governance mechanism from equity ownership structure, characteristics of directors and so on, and standardize the corporate behavior of holding cash.

关 键 词：现金持有量 权衡理论 公司治理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]