双产权制度约束下的公司治理模型  

Corporate Governance Models Restricted by the Double Property

作　　者：郑国泽[1] 安增军[2] 

机构地区：[1]福州大学管理学院,福建福州350002 [2]福建行政学院经济学部,福建福州350002

出　　处：《福建行政学院福建经济管理干部学院学报》2007年第6期71-76,共6页Journal of Fujian School of Administration and Fujian Institute of Economics and Management

摘　　要：在信息不对称的情况下,人力资本所有者拥有比物力资本所有者更多的信息,但人力资本所有者可以通过两种方式使物力资本所有者改变对企业收益率的预期。在假定人力资本存量H和索取权β外生的条件下,物力资本以权益资本和债务资本的形式加入企业,而人力资本所有者投入人力资本存量,企业的控制权在二者间分配。模型中存在一个重要的隐含结论:如果物力资本所有者对人力资本所有者有着良好的尽职预期,那么他将愿意提高人力资本所有者的分享份额并同时提高投资总量。虽然提高人力资本所有者的分享份额会减少自己的相对收益,但是由于人力资本所有者尽职而增加的企业收益会提高他的绝对收益。Under the condition formation than the material capital ZHENG Guo-ze, AN Zeng-jun of information asymmetry, the human capital owner owned more inowner. But the human capital owner can change the anticipation of enterprise profits of the material capital owner by two means. Under the condition of assuming exogenesis of human capital stock H and right of demanding β, the material capital joined in enterprise in the form of the equity capital and the debt capital while the humane capital owner put into the humane capital stock and the control right of the enterprise distributed between the two. A hidden conclusion exis- ted in the models： if the material capital owner had favorable due diligence anticipation to the human capital owner, he will raised the shares of the human capital owner and at the same time raised the investment gross. Although raising the shares of the human capital owner will reduce his related profit, the raised enterprise profit because of due diligence of the human capital owner will improve his absolute profit.

关 键 词：企业 人力资本 物力资本 双产权约束 治理模型 

分 类 号：F279.23[经济管理—企业管理]