两阶段供应链期权契约协调  

Two-Stage Supply Chain Coordination by Contract with Options

作　　者：张正祥[1] 陈志伟[1] 郑冰冰[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《工业工程》2007年第6期42-45,共4页Industrial Engineering Journal

摘　　要：鉴于以往文献对现货市场供应链契约研究的不足,引入在现货市场的情况下买方占主导地位时供应链中双方的反应情况,建立Stackelberg博弈模型进行分析,并通过比较买卖双方签订与不签订契约带来的差异,找出期权契约对双方收益情况的影响,以供双方决策时参考。通过算例分析得出契约条件下参数的成立区间及买卖双方利益的增额。A model of option-based supply contract for the buyer is formulated based on the scenario that a spot market is existed and the buyer is a leader in the channel. The Stackelberg game model is analyzed according to each case, and the game equilibriums are gained in the complete information cases. In addition, the feasible range of current price in the spot market, such as an option-based contract, is constructed for the reference of the buyer and the seller.

关 键 词：供应链契约 STACKELBERG博弈 期权 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]