基于多任务代理理论的高校薪酬激励机制探讨  

Redesign the Incentive System of University Based on Multi-Tasking Agent Theory

作　　者：曾长虹[1] 刘萌芽[1] 

机构地区：[1]南华大学经济管理学院,湖南衡阳421001

出　　处：《南华大学学报（社会科学版）》2007年第6期32-34,39,共4页Journal of University of South China(Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：科研与教学是高校生存与发展的基础,由于教学成果的不可观测性,使得基于可被观测的显性酬薪制度缺乏激励作用,因此如何激励高校教师在科研与教学上都发挥最大的努力是高校管理层面临的最大问题。文章应用多任务代理理论进行分析,重新设计教师的薪酬激励机制,优化教师的价值贡献。Research and teaching are the basis of university existence and development. In terms of the un- observational outcome of teaching, the observational salary system lacks the incentives. That is the reason why we need to encourage the teacher of university to make the best effort in both research and teaching. In this paper, we redesign the salary incentive system and optimize the value of the teachers contributions＇ with theory about multi - mission principal- agent .

关 键 词：多任务代理 激励机制 等级奖金 

分 类 号：F01[经济管理—政治经济学]