高管人员信息披露造假的行为经济学分析  

Behavioral Economic Analysis of Misconduct by Executives in False Financial Reporting

作　　者：叶德珠[1] 蔡赟[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学经济学院金融系,广州510632 [2]暨南大学管理学院会计系,广州510632

出　　处：《财经科学》2008年第1期28-34,共7页Finance & Economics

基　　金：广东省人文社科重点基地重大项目;暨南大学创新团队项目(04SK2D03)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：在决定是否要进行虚假信息披露时,上市公司高管人员需要在造假收益与未来可能的惩罚之间进行比较计算。行为经济学不一致时间偏好理论模型表明,行为主体存在"短视"认知偏差,他们能够进行理性的长期规划,但在实践时却会因对短期收益的过度重视、对未来成本的估计不足,而出现持续的有违初衷的不当行为。以此模型可以逻辑地解释初衷良好的高管人员持续造假的形成机制,而针对"短视"偏差的反偏差设计有助于拓宽证券监管思路。When deciding whether or not to conduct false information disclosure, executives of listed companies need comparisons and calculations between the instant revenue and the possible future penalties. Tune inconsistent preference model in Behavioral Economics indicates that the subjects have myopia cognitive bias, i. e. they can have a rational long- term planning, but in practice, due to the excessive emphasis on the short- term gains and the under- estimation of future costs, sustained misconducts appear contrary to his original intention. This model can logically explain the formation mechanism of sustained false made by the executives whose original intention is good. The debias design according to myopia bias deviations can broaden the securities regulatory scope.

关 键 词：虚假信息披露 行为经济学 短视 证券监管 Sarbanes-Oxley法案 

分 类 号：F233[经济管理—会计学]