证券监管的静态博弈分析  被引量:3

A Static Gaming Analysis on Securities Supervision

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作  者:黄宗福[1] 

机构地区:[1]厦门大学经济学院,福建厦门361005

出  处:《河南金融管理干部学院学报》2007年第6期86-88,共3页Journal of Henan College of Financial Management Cadres

摘  要:与一般市场相比,证券市场表现出更强的垄断、经济外部性、分配不公平、信息不对称等现象,因此,有必要对其进行监管。静态博弈分析表明,要提高监管的效果,需改进稽查的技术手段,加大对机构及其负责人的处罚力度。同时,国家和社会要给予监督部门更大的效用值,以找出最优监管的均衡概率,并建立相应的博弈规则。Compared with general market, securities market exhibits stronger monopoly, economy externality, unfair distribution, information asymmetry, etc. Therefore, it's necessary to supervise it. The static gaming analysis suggests that itg necessary for improving the effect of supervision to improve technologic means for auditing, to intensify the enforcement of penalty for the institutions and their persons - in - charge. At the same time, the nation and the society should give more utility value to regulatory departments so as to find optimal supervision balanced probability and establish corresponding gaming rules for it.

关 键 词:证券市场 证券监管 静态博弈 

分 类 号:F832.1[经济管理—金融学]

 

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