绿色供应链中政府与核心企业进化博弈模型  

An Evolutionary Model between Governments and Core-enterprises in Green Supply Chains

作　　者：朱庆华[1] 窦一杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理学院,大连116024

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2007年第12期85-89,95,共6页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70772085);教育部哲学社会科学研究后期资助项目(06JHQYB0025)

摘　　要：为探究绿色供应链中政府与核心企业的博弈过程,在分析政府和企业在不同策略下各自的成本和收益基础上,运用进化博弈理论研究了政企双方的博弈关系.博弈分析结果显示:核心企业开展绿色供应链管理的成本和收益、政府对企业是否开展绿色供应链管理的奖惩力度,都直接影响博弈结果;政府和核心企业两个群体,在三种情况下存在进化稳定策略.政府和企业为了获得长远的利益,政府制定不断严格的环保法规,加大奖惩力度;核心企业应首先主动实施环境管理,积累相关环保经验,并进一步影响其上下游的企业,这是政府和企业保护环境、双方实现长期共赢的必由之路.In order to investigate the game between governments and core-enterprises in green supply chains, this paper analyses their respective costs and benefits, and studies the game status by evolutionary game theory. Game analysis shows： core-enterprises＇ costs and benefits to implement green supply chain management, subsidies and punishments from governments directly affect the game results; there are three evolutionary stable strategie in three cases. To gain long-term benefit, governments should enact increasingly strict environmental regulations, and increase relevant subsidies and punishment; core-enterprises need to preactively implement environment management, and accumulate environmental experience, and then further affect upstream and downstream enterprises. It is the only way to realize win-win strategy between governments and core-enterprises in the long run.

关 键 词：绿色供应链管理 进化博弈 复制动态 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]