技术标准化联盟产权激励机制:剩余控制权配置博弈分析  

Property Right Incentive Regime of Technological Standardization Alliance:Game Theory for Control Right Allocation of Cooperative Pie

作　　者：孙耀吾[1] 陈立勇[1] 胡志勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,长沙410082

出　　处：《软科学》2008年第2期4-7,共4页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70572058);国家社会科学基金项目(06BJY022)

摘　　要：对2个参与方的一次静态博弈分析结论表明,具有双边否决权的共同控制所有权配置,是唯一能同时引致双方披露隐性知识和选择较大投入的产权模式。与此同时,知识溢出和外部性问题等因素使得博弈模型的均衡结论难以实现帕累托最优,所以充分的知识共享和最大投入还需要具备其它的组织条件。The result of static one - shot game analysis of two players shows that joint ownership based on bilateral veto -power is the only property right pattern, which induces both parties to release their know - how and to choose higher investments in effort. On the other hand, matters such as knowledge spillover and externalities make the equilibrium outcome of game model hard to be Pareto Optimality. So, full knowledge sharing and optimal effort level will be achieved only under other organizational conditions.

关 键 词：技术标准化联盟 激励机制 合作剩余 控制权配置 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F124.4[经济管理—世界经济] F224.0