逆向物流系统激励机制优化研究  

A Study of Optimizing Incentive Mechanism of Reverse Logistics System

作　　者：杨华[1] 马飞[1] 田小川[2] 孙宝凤[2] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学管理学院,吉林长春130025 [2]吉林大学交通学院,吉林长春130025

出　　处：《西南交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2008年第1期13-17,共5页Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：吉林省科技厅软科学项目(20060620);吉林省科技厅国际合作项目(20060705)

摘　　要：随着环境立法日益严格以及市场竞争的加剧,逆向物流日益引起国内外企业管理者和学者的重视。以委托—代理理论为理论基础,通过引入辅助观测变量——制造商对其他零售商回收的废旧产品再处理所得的收益——建立优化模型,可用以分析辅助观测变量和其他因素对激励强度系数和代理成本的影响。分析结果表明:适当引入辅助观测变量能有效降低代理成本,提高激励强度。Due to the more strict legislation on environment protection and an increasing market competition, reverse logistics has gradually attracted the attention of enterprise management personnel and researchers. The paper, based on the principal-agent theory and introducing an auxiliary observing variable, i.e. the profits gained by producer from recycling used products that are recovered by retailers, sets up an optimal model of analyzing the influence of auxiliary observing variable and other factors upon the incentive intensity and agency costs. The results of analysis indicate that proper introduction of auxiliary observing variable can reduce the agency costs and increase incentive intensity.

关 键 词：逆向物流 物流系统 激励机制 委托-代理理论 激励优化 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]