公司治理、审计风险与审计定价——基于CCGI^(NK)的经验证据  

Corporate Governance, Audit Risk and Audit Pricing: Empirical Evidence Based on CCGI^(NK)

作　　者：潘克勤[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南财经学院会计学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2008年第1期106-112,共7页Nankai Business Review

摘　　要：本文采用南开大学公司治理研究中心发表在2004年《管理世界》第二期的论文中公布的2002年度"中国上市公司治理100佳"的公司治理指数作为公司治理质量的替代变量,以"100佳"中的55家2001年至2004年的数据作为研究对象,采用多元回归方法,分析公司治理指数、审计风险、审计师规模与审计定价的关系。结果发现,公司治理指数越高,审计定价越低;随着公司治理指数提高,国际四大和本土五大明显降低了审计定价,而本土次五大的审计定价却没有明显下降,说明审计定价受到公司治理风险影响,国际四大及本土五大对源于公司内部治理的风险更加敏感,原因可能是大型事务所运用了风险导向审计模式,在争取到优质客户后,采取了合理的风险定价策略,以保持优质客户。上述发现对大型审计师获得审计收费声誉溢价的观点做了局部修正。This paper uses the same 55 Chinese listed companies from year 2001 to 2004 as the sample, adopts the 2002 year＇s index of corporate governance （shortened form, CCGI^NK, issued by The Research Center of Corporate Governance of Nankai University） as the corporate governance level, and adopts the method of multiple- regression, to analyze the relationship among the corporate gov- ernance, audit risk, auditor size, and audit pricing. The lists of 55 Chinese listed companies and the corporate governance index come from the 2002 year＇s 100 Best Chinese listed companies in corporate governance which was promulgated by The Research Center of Corporate Governance of Nankai University, the lists and the corporate governance index was published on Management World, the 2th periodical,2004. It finds that, the higher the CCGI^NK, the lower the audit price, and with the increase of CCGI^NK, the Big4 and domestic Big5, or Big10, does reduce the audit price significantly, but domestic second Big5 does not reduce the audit price significantly. It suggests that, the audit price is adjusted by audit risk which originates from corporate governance, and the Big4 and domestic Big5, or Big10, is more sensitive to audit risk which originates from corporate governance. The reason may be that the big auditors use the risk-oriented audit pattern more reasonably, and they have used the risk-oriented audit pattern earlier than the releasing of new independent audit standards of year 2006, and adopts the risk-pricing strategy to keep the clients with higher quality, because the Chinese independent audit market is a competed market. This paper also makes an auditor choice prediction, and it finds that the coefficient of CCGI^NK is significantly negative, that is to say, the higher quality clients tend to choose the small auditors, and the auditing demand of signaling to the market is not strong. This paper makes a partial modification on the opinion of big auditors getting reputation price.

关 键 词：公司治理 南开公司治理指数 审计风险 审计师规模 审计定价 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F239.4[经济管理—国民经济]