CRM中多阶段信号博弈模型的建立与分析  

A Study of Multi-Stage Signaling Game Modeling in Customer Relation Management(CRM)

作　　者：杨宏桥[1] 尹秋菊[1] 颜志军[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报》2008年第2期185-188,共4页Transactions of Beijing Institute of Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70502021)

摘　　要：针对企业-客户间由信息不对称引起的道德风险和逆向选择问题,为企业和客户的交易过程提供决策支持.将信号博弈应用到客户关系管理中,分别建立了企业-客户单向多阶段信号博弈展开模型和企业-客户双向多阶段信号博弈数学模型,并利用目标分析法和逆推归纳法求出了这两个模型的分离均衡解.得到了交易过程中企业客户双方的均衡信号选择.研究结果表明,不同类型的企业和客户,其均衡信号行为不同,从而可以根据其行为结果判断其真实类型.To resolve the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection that may arise from asymmetric information between a business and customer, and to offer decision-support for business and customers, signaling game theory is applied into the customer relation management. An extended model of single-direction multi-stage signaling game between business and customer, and a mathematical model of bi-direction multi-stage signaling game between businesses and customers were established. Furthermore, methods of goal analysis and backwards induction were used to obtain the separating equilibriums of the above two models. The equilibrium signal selections of business and customer during the transaction are obtained. Reseach results showed business and customer of different types will take different equilibrium signals, which offers a basis to judge their true types.

关 键 词：客户关系管理 多阶段信号博弈 分离均衡 贝叶斯均衡 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]