考虑声誉激励的供应链合作伙伴演化博弈模型  

An Evolutionary Game Model for Supply Chain Partnerships System Based Reputation Incentive

作　　者：于海生[1] 赵林度[1] 龙迎红[2] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学系统工程研究所,南京210096 [2]鲁东大学数学与信息学院,烟台264025

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2008年第4期58-63,共6页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：在考虑企业声誉激励的前提下.运用间接演化方法,提出了供应链合作伙伴(Supply Chain Partnerships,SCP)系统中企业合作偏好度的演化博弈(Evolutionary Game)模型,分析了SCP系统的内在演化机制,研究了仅与产量相关以及与产量和企业合作偏好度都相关的企业声誉激励机制对SCP系统企业合作偏好度演化稳定的影响,得到了相关的结论.The process to form SCP system is an evolutionary game among the enterprise-agents. And it is dynamic process of enterprise-agents strategy behavior. Therefore, based reputation incentive, it brings forward the indirect evolution model of cooperation inclination degree among the enterprise-agents of SCP system. And it presents series of conclusion about SCP system cooperation inclination degree evolutionary stable. It will have important practice value to improve decision-making dynamic adapt ability of SCP system and implement efficiency control policy.

关 键 词：供应链合作伙伴 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 间接演化 声誉 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]