论语句的指称  

On the Reference of a Sentence

作　　者：王健平[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学政治与行政学院,广东广州510631

出　　处：《华南师范大学学报（社会科学版）》2008年第1期28-33,共6页Journal of South China Normal University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：广州市社会科学发展"十一五"规划项目"当代逻辑哲学若干前沿问题研究"(批准号:07Z42)

摘　　要：弗雷格在区别语句思想和指称的前提下所提出的真值外延理论存在着较大的问题。语句的指称应该是维氏所讲的事实,而事实又表现为各种各样不同的关系。语句的指称和语词的指称一样同属于对象世界,而真值只不过是人们对语句与事实是否相符的一种判定。Under the presupposition of distinguishing the sense and reference of a sentence,Frege believes that the reference of a sentence is its truth;however,his proof seems to be too weak.In the analyses of description,Russell's theory means that the reference of a sentence can not completely be decided by the references of the words in the sentence.In natural language,the truth of a composite sentence will not be changed if the ingredient is substituted by something which has the same truth doesn't seem to be proved.Wittgenstein once criticized Frege's concept of 'truth' directly.In this paper,the reference of a sentence is what Wittgenstein calls fact,and the representations of fact are some variable relations.Both the references of a sentence or a word belong to the object world,but the truth is a judgment of whether a sentence corresponds with the fact.

关 键 词：语句 真值 事实 

分 类 号：B811.1[哲学宗教—逻辑学]