我国高管人员报酬激励制度的有效性——基于沪深上市公司的实证研究  

An Empirical Study on the Effectiveness of Incentive Systems for Chinese Top Managers——Based on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Listed Companies

作　　者：唐清泉[1] 朱瑞华[1] 甄丽明[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《当代经济管理》2008年第2期59-65,共7页Contemporary Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70772084);中山大学"985工程"产业与区域发展创新基地的资助

摘　　要：如何设计后股权分置时代的高管报酬机制将面临很多挑战。研究表明,短期报酬具有有效性,这意味着在设计国有控股公司的股权激励时,依然不能忽略短期报酬激励和职务升迁等政治和非货币的激励;长期报酬激励不显著,这说明我国股权激励的"利益趋同效应"不明显,目前股权激励的有效性前提还不够;高管激励倾斜度低说明"大锅饭"仍未打破,这需要解除报酬管制,向核心高管倾斜,避免"搭便车"式的激励;长短期报酬结构的结果说明如果将固定任期制转为弹性任期制,更能实现报酬激励的有效性。This is an empirical study on the effectiveness of compensation Incentive Systems for Chinese Top Managers by researching into Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies from 2002 to 2004. The empirical results suggest that short-term incentive is effective, and it means when designing the remuneration incentive of stateowned enterprises, we cannot neglect political and non-monetary incentive, such as short-term incentive and position promotion. Longterm incentive is ineffective, which means ＂ behalf alignment effect＂ of share option incentive not obvious and the premises of effectiveness not sufficiently. The low gradient of incentive of top managers indicated the equalitarianism of compensation is not broken. It needs to relieve the control of compensation incentive, inclining to the core manager and avoiding free ride incentive. The compensation structure of short-term and long-term reflects that it needs convert the fixed tenure system into flexible tenure system to implement the effectiveness of remuneration incentive.

关 键 词：报酬有效性 长期报酬 短期报酬 股权激励 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F832.5[经济管理—国民经济]