广义Stackelberg市场上企业横向兼并获利性研究  

Profitability of Horizontal Merger in Generalized Stackelberg Market

作　　者：张福利[1] 施建军[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2008年第2期92-96,共5页Journal of Audit & Economics

摘　　要：基于广义Stackelberg寡头垄断市场,研究企业横向兼并的获利性和社会福利问题。结果表明,一个领头企业与一个跟随企业之间总是存在兼并动机,而领头企业之间很少存在兼并动机;当边际生产成本的差异程度较大时,两个跟随企业之间总是存在兼并动机;兼并导致的企业利润增加是以社会福利下降为代价的。The profitability and social welfare of horizontal merger is studied based on generalized Stackelberg oligopoly markets, the result shows that a leader and a follower always have an incentive to merge, but leaders rarely do. When the differences between the constant marginal costs of production of leaders and that of followers are significant, two followers always have an incentive to merge. As far as social welfare is concerned, any of the profitable mergers is at the cost of deterioration of social welfare.

关 键 词：广义Stackelberg市场 横向兼并 战略力量 社会福利 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]