基于经理人代理和管家行为倾向的民营企业公司治理选择  

The Choice of Governance in China Private Enterprise Based on the Behavior of Managers about an Agent or Steward

作　　者：曹芳[1] 钟乃雄[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学产业经济学院,广州510632

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2008年第4期190-194,共5页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

基　　金：广州市哲学社会科学规划课题(06-YZ3-23)

摘　　要：经理人实施的是代理人行为还是管家行为是其在对企业内部和外部治理机制的预期利益权衡之后做出的理性反应,也是与企业主博弈的结果。在我国民营企业外部制度约束薄弱、内部治理机制失效的条件下,经理人的理性选择更多地表现为代理人倾向。因此,为约束经理人代理行为,而激励其管家行为,通过对经理人代理和管家行为倾向特征的分析,从民营企业内部治理和外部治理角度提出了各自的公司治理选择。Managers is an agent or a steward depends on the response after managers weigh the internal meehartism and external mechanism of the corporate governance, and the results that the managers and the owners play game each other as well. Under the condition of the weakness of the external mechanisms and the invalidation of the internal mechanisms in china enterprises, the rational choices of the managers tend to be an agent. So, in order to restrict the managers act as the agent and spur the managers act as the steward, the paper puts forward some suggestions about the internal and external mechanisms through the analysis of the characters of the agent and steward.

关 键 词：代理理论 管家理论 民营企业 内部治理 外部治理 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理]