窄记忆和宽知识--外在论和自我知识相容性问题的一个解决方案  

Narrow Memory and Wide Knowledge:A Solution to the Problem of Compatibility of Externalism and Self-knowledge

作　　者：田平[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学价值与文化研究中心、哲学与社会学学院,北京100875

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2008年第4期12-18,共7页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地基金资助(06JJD720004)

摘　　要：20世纪70年代语义外在论观点的提出,引发了关于外在论与自我知识相容性问题的广泛讨论。柏高先针对柏芝的相容论论证提出的记忆论证是非相容论的重要论证之一。然而,柏高先的论证由于对记忆持有内在论的看法受到相容论者的批评。拉德娄等人提出外在论的记忆观,进一步辩护外在论与自我知识的相容性。值得注意的是,外在论的记忆观不得不付出的代价却是动摇记忆的认知地位。本文提出,只有一方面将记忆内容看做是窄内容,即看做是从被记忆的原初信念内容中抽离出来的那部分得到明晰表征的、不受语境约束的、跨语境的内容;另一方面将自我知识看做是宽知识,用具有语境约束性质的自我知识取代笛卡尔的单纯"我思"式的自我知识,外在论与自我知识的相容性才能得到有效的辩护。The development of semantic externalism in the 1970s was followed by a debate on the compatibility of externalism and self-knowl- edge. Boghossian＇s memory argument is one of the most important arguments against the compatibilist view. However, some compatibilists attack Boghossian＇s argument by pointing out that his understanding of memory is internalistic. Ludlow and others developed the externalist view of memory to defend the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. However, the price the externalist view of memory has to pay is that it undermines the epistemic status of memory. This paper argues that only if we take the content of memory to be narrow, i. e. , to be the explicit and across-contextual content that is an abstraction of the original belief content, and take self-knowledge to be wide knowledge and replace the Cartesian self-knowledge with the contextually constrained self-knowledge, can the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge be effectively defended.

关 键 词：外在论 自我知识 记忆 宽内容 窄内容 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]