具有Stackelberg博弈和网络外部性的扩展Hotelling模型  

An Extended Hotelling Model with Stackelberg Game and Network Externality

作　　者：刁新军[1] 杨德礼[1] 胡润波[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《系统工程》2008年第2期31-34,共4页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672092);中国博士后基金资助项目(20070410080)

摘　　要：在具有不对称网络外部性的Hotelling模型中,引入Stackelberg博弈价格均衡。在放松厂商定位必须局限于消费者分布空间的假设后,相比较于传统的Nash博弈价格均衡结果,厂商通过Stackelberg价格博弈中可以选择更大的产品差异性,市场先进入者在均衡价格、市场份额和利润方面比后进入者具有先动优势。当网络效用系数相同时,市场先进入者所获得价格、市场份额和利润都大于其Nash均衡时所获得结果;市场后进入者所获得市场份额小于其Nash均衡的结果,但其价格和利润则根据网络效用系数的不同而变化。The paper introduce Stackelberg equilibrium pricing in Hotelling model with asymmetric network externality. Relaxing the restriction that the firms must be locationed in consumer spatial distribution, the firms obtain more product differentiation in Stackelberg equilibrium comparing traditional Nash equilibrium. Price leader enjoying higher price, share, profits in the market than the subsequent entrant. When network externality coefficient is same ,leader in market get higher outcome than that from Nash equilibrium;follower in market get smaller market share than that from Nash equilibrium, it＇s price and profit are changeable with network externality coefficient.

关 键 词：产品差异性 Stackelberg博弈Hotelling模型 网络外部性 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]