嵌入讨价还价博弈的经营者报酬对公司绩效影响研究  

A Study on the Relationship between CEO Compensation and Corporate Performance Considering the Bargaining Game

作　　者：宁家耀[1] 宋增基[1] 王蕾[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]英国曼彻斯特大学商学院,曼彻斯特M139PL

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2008年第4期93-99,共7页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家杰出青年基金(70525005);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(03JD630011)

摘　　要：文章研究表明:董事会与CEO之间的权力博弈是影响CEO报酬和公司绩效关系的重要因素。中国国有上市公司董事会与CEO之间的博弈扭曲了CEO报酬机制,损害了CEO报酬对公司绩效的促进作用,应当从博弈的制度环境入手矫正上述博弈机制,理顺CEO报酬机制的作用机理。This article shows that the bargaining game between CEO and board on CEO compensation is a key factor influencing the relationship between CEO compensation and corporate performance. In China, this bargaining game distorts the working ways of CEO compensation, which hurts the firm performance. Reconstructing the institution in which the bargaining game carries out will be a alternative measure addressing on the twisty CEO compensation mechanism.

关 键 词：CEO报酬 讨价还价博弈 公司治理 

分 类 号：F406.15[经济管理—产业经济]