高管薪酬结构对经营绩效的影响  

Effect of Top Managers' Compensation Structure on Corporation Performance:an Empirical Analysis of Listed Companies in China

作　　者：郭昱[1] 顾海英[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2008年第4期100-103,共4页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于技术许可中价格契约的农业知识产权保护研究"(70673064)的子课题

摘　　要：实证研究表明薪酬结构会影响公司的息税前利润和股票市场表现,但对传统上衡量盈利水平的净资产收益率影响不显著。同时包含年薪和持股权激励的薪酬结构可以促使高管关注公司短期目标和长期发展,减少高管人员利用职权侵占股东利益的行为,但是要把既领年薪又拥有持股权的高管人数控制在一定范围内才有利于提高管理的效率。The empirical analysis shows the structure of top managers＇ compensation has effect on EBIT （ earning before interest an tax ） and share price, but has little effect on ROE （return on equity） which is a traditional profitability index. A top managers＇ compensation structure comprises annual salary and stock option incentive can bring the managers＇ attention to both short-term target and long-run development, and reduce moral hazard. The study also indicates that the proper number of managers who get both annual salary and stock option incentive is important to improve management efficiency.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 年薪 持股权 经营绩效 

分 类 号：F406.15[经济管理—产业经济]