控制权、现金流权与资本结构--一项基于我国民营上市公司面板数据的实证分析  

Controlling Rights,Cash Flow Rights and Capital Structure——Empirical Analysis Based on Panel Data of Private Listed Companies in China

作　　者：韩亮亮[1] 李凯[2] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学／东北大学工商管理学院,110136 [2]东北大学工商管理学院,110004

出　　处：《会计研究》2008年第3期66-73,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(批准号:07BJY016);国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:70772097)阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：本文利用我国91家民营上市公司2003-2005年面板数据检验终极股东控制与资本结构的关系。研究发现,终极股东控制权一致性与总资产负债率、流动负债率显著正相关,终极股东控制权/现金流权偏离度与总资产负债率、流动负债率显著负相关。这表明资本结构决策本身存在代理问题,终极股东一方面积极利用股权融资的非稀释效应,另一方面对负债的破产威胁效应和利益转移限制效应作出了壕沟防守反应。This paper examines the relationship between the ultimate controlling shareholder and capital structure by use of panel date of 91 private listed companies from 2003 to 2005 in China.The result shows that the controlling rights consistency of ultimate shareholders is positively related to the rate of total debt to total asset and the rate of liquid debt to total asset,and the divergence of controlling rights from cash flow rights(V/C and V-C)are negatively related to the rate of total debt to total asset and the rate of liquid debt to total asset.This implies that ultimate controlling shareholders not only take full advantages of non-dilution effect of equity financing,but also take active entrenchments for the bankruptcy threat effect and constraint tunneling effect of debt.

关 键 词：终极股东 控制权 现金流权偏离度 资本结构 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]