政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购  

Government Intervention,Political Connections and the Mergers of Local Government-Controlled Enterprises

作　　者：潘红波[1] 夏新平[2] 余明桂[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院 [2]华中科技大学管理学院,邮政编码430074

出　　处：《经济研究》2008年第4期41-52,共12页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:70602013)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文以2001—2005年间发生的地方国有上市公司收购非上市公司的事件为样本,研究地方政府干预、政治关联对地方国有企业并购绩效的影响。研究发现:地方政府干预对盈利样本公司的并购绩效有负面影响,而对亏损样本公司的并购绩效有正面影响。这说明,出于自身的政策性负担或政治晋升目标,地方政府会损害或支持当地国有上市公司,这为政府"掠夺之手理论"和"支持之手理论"提供了实证支持。我们还发现,盈利样本公司的并购绩效与政治关联正相关。这表明,政治关联可以作为法律保护的替代机制来保护企业产权免受政府损害。Using a sample of mergers with local government-controlled acquirers and unlisted target firms from 2001 to 2005, we examine the effects of local government intervention and political connections on the performance of local government-controUed acquirers. We find that local government intervention has a negative impact on the performance of local government-controUed acquirers with good operating performance before merger announcement, while a positive impact on the performance of local government-controlled acquirers with poor operating performance before merger announcement. These results indicate that local government has motive to grab or help the local government-controlled firms providing support for the ＂grabbing-hand model＂ and ＂helping-hand model＂. We also find that political connections have positive effects on the performance of local government- controlled acquirers with good operating performance before merger announcement, which indicates that political connections can be used as the substitution of investor protection to prevent the local government from expropriating the firms.

关 键 词：政府干预 掠夺之手 政治关联 地方国有企业 并购 

分 类 号：F279.2[经济管理—企业管理]