旅游景区门票价格上涨的博弈分析和对策  

Game Analysis and Countermeasures on Prices of the Entrance Tickets Rising in Tourism Attractions

作　　者：张明新[1] 姚国荣[2] 陆林[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽师范大学旅游学院,安徽芜湖241003 [2]安徽师范大学经济管理学院,安徽芜湖241003

出　　处：《皖西学院学报》2008年第2期101-104,共4页Journal of West Anhui University

基　　金：安徽省高校青年教师科研资助计划项目(2006jqw048);安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSKF05-06D26)

摘　　要：门票价格涉及两个主要的利益相关者:门票价格制定者和旅游者。文章从完全信息博弈和非完全信息博弈探讨了由于双方的信息拥有量的不同而采取不同的策略,并通过对博弈矩阵和博弈树的具体分析得出在完全信息博弈中,门票价格制定者不会做出涨价的决定;而在非完全信息博弈中,门票价格制定者会做出涨价的决定。并根据上述的分析进而提出了解决信息不对称的一些建设性的意见。The prices of the entrance tickets concern two kinds of main relative men on benefit： the framers of the prices of the entrance tickets and tourists. This paper discusses the different strategies both of them develop because of their different quantitative information from complete information game and incomplete information game, and by analyzing concretely Game Matrix and Game Tree draws a conclusion that in complete information game the framers of the prices of the entrance tickets won＇t make a decision to appreciate and in incomplete information game they will do, and according to preceding analysis and put forward to some constructive suggestions which solve the disorooortion of information.

关 键 词：非完全信息 博弈 景区门票价格 对策 

分 类 号：F590.8[经济管理—旅游管理]