基于委托-代理框架的独立董事多期激励动态博弈模型  

The Dynamic Game of the Independent Directors Based on the Principal-agent Framework

作　　者：党文娟[1] 张宗益[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400040

出　　处：《系统工程》2008年第3期65-69,共5页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家杰出青年基金资助项目(70525005)

摘　　要：当前的激励机制无法调动独立董事参与公司治理的积极性,本文运用非完全信息动态博弈方法建立了对独立董事的长期激励约束机制模型。重点研究了考虑任职期限的业绩激励以及考虑期限的股票期权激励等两种形式的激励模式,对比分析了不同激励模型对独立董事工作积极性的影响,得出了一系列技术性结论,可以为独立董事激励机制设计提供理论支持和方法指导。The current incentive system can not do business on the corporate governance of independent outside director. This paper establish an economic incentive for restriction mechanism model by applying an incomplete information dynamical game method for independent director, focus on two different incentive model： performance incentive modei with term and stock option incentive model Analyze what factors effect the work level, and get conclusion from these model. These conclusion can be helpful in the mechanism design of independent outside director.

关 键 词：激励机制 动态博弈 委托代理 独立董事 

分 类 号：O221[理学—运筹学与控制论]