上市公司董事会特征与违规行为  

Board Characteristics and Fraudulent Behavior of Listed Companies

作　　者：高雷[1] 罗洋[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京信息工程大学国际金融研究院,江苏南京210044 [2]汕头大学商学院,广东汕头515063

出　　处：《广东金融学院学报》2008年第3期106-113,共8页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance

基　　金：国家社科基金(07CJY001);中国博士后科研基金(20060400690)

摘　　要：上市公司独立董事的规模、董事会规模和董事会成员的报酬对于上市公司的违规行为起着显著的约束作用。董事长与总经理两职部分分离的治理形式,并不是影响上市公司违规行为的重要因素。改变中国上市公司的"一股独大"的股权结构,规避中国上市公司违规行为现状而言,更为重要。应该适当增加董事的持股比例,这样才能充分激励董事了解和监督公司运营,从而约束管理层的违规行为。The size of the board of the independent directors, the size of the board of directors and the compensation of the board members play a significant role in prohibiting listed companies from fraudulent behaviors. The separation between the chairman and CEO is not an important factor of the fraudulent behavior of listed companies; what is more important for eliminating the fraudulent behavior of Chinese listed companies is changing the ownership structure dominated by a single big shareholder. And we shall increasing executive shareholding, in order to promote their incentive to supervise and prevent the management from fraudulent behaviors.

关 键 词：董事会 上市公司 违规行为 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]