基于公平心理的报酬契约设计及代理成本分析  

Payment Contract Design and Agency Cost Analysis Based on Fairness Preference

作　　者：魏光兴[1] 蒲勇健[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2008年第2期58-63,68,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(07XJL004)

摘　　要：针对标准契约理论在设计报酬契约时忽略了公平心理因素这一问题,本研究以行为契约理论为工具,设计了引入公平心理之后的最优报酬契约,并进一步分析了公平心理对激励效率的影响。理论分析表明:公平心理较弱时,最优报酬契约是团队相对主义契约,其中公平心理会导致公平租金和公平风险补偿两种激励效率损失;公平心理较弱时,最优报酬契约是团队平均主义契约,其中公平心理只会导致公平风险补偿一种激励效率损失。这些研究结论对企业设计报酬契约具有重要参考意义,比如企业应该对公平心理强弱不同的员工设计和提供不同结构形式的报酬契约。Aiming at the problem that classical contract theory ignores fairness preference in the course of designing payment contract, this paper researches and designs the optimal payment contract based on fairness preference by behavioral contract theory, and analyses the influence of fairness preference on incentive efficiency. The theoretic analysis indicates that the optimal contract under weak fairness preference is the team contact of relativism, by which the fairness preference leads to two kinds of incentive efficiency loss, the fairness rent and the compensation for fairness risk, while the optimal contract under strong fairness preference is the team contact of equalitarianism, by which the fairness preference leads to only one kind of incentive efficiency loss, the compensation for fairness risk. All the above research conclusions are important for enterprise to design payment contract. For example, enterprise should offer different payment contracts according to employees endowed with fairness preferences of different strength.

关 键 词：公平心理 报酬契约设计 激励效率损失 行为契约理论 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] C936[经济管理—国民经济]