公司治理、负隧道效应与控股股东股权流动性  

Corporate Governance,Negative Tunneling and Liquidity of Controlling Shareholder's Stake

作　　者：赵洪江[1] 尹宇明[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《软科学》2008年第6期27-31,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"项目(教技司[2005]2号);教育部人文社科项目(07JA630038);电子科技大学青年科技基金(JX0657)

摘　　要：认为控股股东的股权流动性是重要的公司治理机制,提供一个控股股东股权流动性与隧道挖掘行为的一个简单模型。模型显示对于以资产价值最大化为目标的大股东,他们所持股权的流动性将影响其隧道行为的机会成本,基于总体资产价值最大化的约束,控股股东可能采取支持上市公司而不是掏空上市公司的做法,即"负隧道效应(Negative Tunneling)"。在定向增发过程中,出于总体资产价值最大化的考虑,控股股东可能选择注入优质资产而不是劣质资产。初步的实证检验支持这个结论。This paper holds that liquidity of controlling shareholder＇s stake is an important variable to deal with cor- porate governmen system. This paper establishes a simple model to explore relationship between liquidity and tunneling behavior. It shows that for those shareholders who wish to maximize their asset value, the liquidity will affect their opportunity cost, so in order to maximize their asset value, they maybe prop up the listed company rather than tunnel the company, i. e., negative tunneling. In the case of private security offering, the liquidity of controlling shareholder＇s stake may affect the choice of asset quality sold to the listed company, subject to constraint of maximization of its total asset, the controlling shareholder may choose to sell superior asset rather than inferior asset to the listed comoanv. Preliminary emnirical test sunnorts that argument.

关 键 词：公司治理 负隧道效应 控股股东 股权流动性 定向增发 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]