供应商与零售商的动态非对称演化博弈  

An Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Between Supplier and Retailer

作　　者：单汩源[1] 江黎明[1] 吴炜炜[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《商业研究》2008年第7期9-12,共4页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目;项目编号:70671037。

摘　　要：传统博弈理论关于参与人完全理性的假设,难以应用于现实工作中。而基于有限理性的演化博弈理论则克服了这些缺陷。从激励的角度建立信息不对称环境下供应商与零售商的非对称演化博弈模型,采用复制动态机制对博弈模型进行详细分析,得出模型的三个局部平衡点不是演化稳定策略;而另外两个平衡点哪个是模型最终的演化稳定策略是由五个假设因素决定。The restrictions of complete rationality, makes the traditional game theory hardly applicable in practice the traditional game theory. However, the evolutionary game theory, based on bounded rationality, can overcome those limitations. From the perspective of compensation the paper sets up an asymmetric model of the evolutionary game between supplier and retailer with asymmetric information. By analyzing the game model with replicated dynamics mechanism, it maintains that the three local balance points of the model are not the evolutionary stable strategy; yet setween the other two balance points which is the final evolutionary stable strategy depends on the five hypothetic factors.

关 键 词：信息不对称 演化博弈 复制动态机制 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F713.53[经济管理—市场营销]