论刑事诉讼中的囚徒困境与控辩博弈——以辩诉交易为视点  

On Prisoner's Dilemma and Game of Plea in Criminal Proceedings——In the View of the Plea Bargain

作　　者：高珊琦[1] 孙唯峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北政法大学刑事法学院,陕西西安710063

出　　处：《西安财经学院学报》2008年第4期124-128,共5页Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：陕西省社科基金项目"中国建立辩诉交易制度之意义及设想"(07F004Z)

摘　　要：从博弈论的视角看,大陆法系国家刑事诉讼程序中所适用的传统起诉模式容易导致囚徒困境。在囚徒困境中,控辩双方所形成的纳什均衡并不是双方受益最大的选择,不能形成帕累托最优。美国的辩诉交易制度,由于控辩双方的信息比较对称,各自的交流又不存在很大的阻隔,且双方都是多次博弈,容易形成帕累托最优。将被害人纳入辩诉交易的主体范围,可以对被害人的利益进行更好的保护。Looking from the Game theory, criminal prosecution procedure of the country which is suitable and traditional in the mainland legal system. Which is easy to cause the difficult of conviction position. Controls in the convict difficult position debates Nash who both sides form balanced is not the both sides maximum gain choice, cannot form Pareto optimum. US plea bargaining system, because controls debates the bilateral informa- tion quite to be symmetrical, respective exchange does not have very big impediment, also both sides are gamble many times, easy to form the Pareto optimum. The victims will join in the body and be pretected well.

关 键 词：刑事诉讼 辩诉交易 博弈论 囚徒困境 帕累托最优 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] D925.2[政治法律—诉讼法学]