基于混合策略纳什均衡的委托代理问题分析  

Analysis on Principal Agent Based on Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium

作　　者：王维东[1] 郝传波[1] 

机构地区：[1]黑龙江科技学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150027

出　　处：《商业经济》2008年第7期56-57,67,共3页Business & Economy

摘　　要：在现代公司中,处于各权力关系中心的是所有者和经营者,委托代理问题是现代公司治理的核心问题,即所有者行为人对经营者的监督以及激励则是公司治理的核心和关键。从委托人对代理人监督的角度出发,利用博弈论的方法建立模型,二者之间的分析关系及其相关因素,其结论为公司治理目标是减低所有者的监督成本,使经营者以股东利益最大化为目标的概率越大越好。The core of rights in modem corporation is the owner and operator. The principal agent is the central problem of modem corporation governance, i,e, the owner＇s supervision and motivation to the operator is the core of corporation governance. Beginning with the principal＇s supervision to agent, applying game theory to build model and analyze the relations between the two factors and relevant factors, the author concludes that the objective of corporation governance is to decrease the owner＇s supervising cost and the operator＇s aim is to maximize shareholder＇s profit,

关 键 词：公司治理 委托代理问题 混合策略纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]