非对称信息下企业员工素质类型目标考核甄别机制  

The Screening Mechanism of Goal Assessment for Employee Under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：唐润芝[1] 雷勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]长江师范学院管理科学系,重庆408003

出　　处：《商业研究》2008年第8期85-87,共3页Commercial Research

基　　金：重庆市高校优秀中青年骨干教师资助计划;项目编号:[2003]2号

摘　　要：采用数量经济学方法,利用委托-代理理论,给出在存在员工素质信息非对称条件下,企业构建的员工素质类型目标考核甄别机制;指出基于两阶段工资与考核标准的目标考核甄别机制具有信息甄别功能,对于给定的员工通过考核概率,企业增加第二阶段工资与减少第一阶段工资,加大工资差距,更有利于促进对两类不同素质员工的有效甄别与增加低素质员工企图冒充高素质员工的成本。The paper uses the quantitative economies and principle - agent theory to analyse the mechanism of goal assessment for employee under asymmetric information in enterprise. It points out the mechanism is provided with the screening ability based on two - stage wages and assessment standard. It helps to improve the efficient screen ability by increasing the gap between two - stage wages and to add the cost for the employee with low ability in order to imitate the employee with high ability.

关 键 词：非对称信息 裁员 目标考核甄别 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]