制造商与销售商双向选择与利益分配  

Two-way Choice and Distribution of Interests of the Manufacturer and Seller

作　　者：杜义飞[1] 李仕明[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2008年第15期21-30,共10页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20060391028);电子科技大学青年基金项目(JX0654)

摘　　要：分别建立制造商和销售商主导的供应链的利润分配模型,阐明为什么制造商和销售商都努力使自己成为供应链的主导企业,说明销售商主导型供应链竞争存在优势的原因.制造商主导的供应链中,制造商通过决定产品的批发价格最优化自身的利润分配;在销售商主导的供应链中,销售商通过决定批量折扣率达到对产品批发价格的控制,为销售商带来更大的利润.制造商和销售商在各自主导供应链的利润分配均大于供应链总体利润最大时的利润平均分配.给出一个具体的算例验证模型的结论.This paper sets up the profit distribution models of supply chains dominated by manufacturer and seller separately, expound why manufacturer and seller make great efforts to make themselves become leading enterprises of the supply chain, explain why it has the competitive advantage that seller dominate the supplies chain at the same time. In the supply chain dominated by manufacturer, the manufacturer optimizes his distribution of profit by determining the wholesale price. In the supply chain dominated by seller, the seller control the wholesale price of the products by determining the quantity discount rate and it brings the seller larger profit. The manufacture and the seller＇s distribution of profit gained in the supply chain dominated by the manufacture and the seller respectively is greater than the average profit when overall profit of the supply chain is maximized. Finally we provide an example to explain the conclusion of the models.

关 键 词：供应链 制造商主导 销售商主导 双向选择 利益分配 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]