政府管制模型研究:基于消费者参与的理论视角  

Analysis on Government Regulation Model:A Theoretical Perspective of Consumer’s Participation

作　　者：徐云鹏[1] 张旭昆[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学经济学院,杭州310027 [2]浙江工商大学,杭州310018

出　　处：《技术经济》2008年第8期71-74,共4页Journal of Technology Economics

摘　　要：委托-代理理论被广泛应用于激励性管制模型研究,但其约束条件并不总能得到满足。本文放宽管制模型的约束条件,并将消费者作为信息传递者引入管制模型,探讨了立法者利用消费者信息来提高社会福利水平的条件以及对消费者的最优转移支付水平。Principal-agent theory has been applied widely the study on incentive regulation model. However, the constraint conditions of this theory can＇t be satisfied all the time. This paper looses the constraint conditions of the regulation modle, and introduces the consumer as the signal deliver into the regulation model. And it analyzes the conditions of improving social welfare level through using the consumer＇s information and the optimal level of transfer payment to consumer.

关 键 词：政府管制 委托一代理理论 激励相容 社会福利 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]