控制权、资金占用与掏空——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Control Rights,Embezzlement of Funds and Tunneling-Evidence from Listed Companies in China

作　　者：黎来芳[1] 王化成[1] 张伟华[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《中国软科学》2008年第8期121-127,共7页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70572096)

摘　　要：本文从掏空的视角对控制权与资金占用的关系进行实证分析,研究发现:私人终极控制的上市公司中资金占用规模显著高于国家终极控制的上市公司;集团控制的上市公司中资金占用规模显著高于非集团控制的上市公司;控股股东持股比例越高,上市公司中资金占用规模越小;其他大股东持股比例越高,上市公司中资金占用规模越小。This paper analyzes the relation betw^n control rights and embezzlement of funds. Conclusions can be drawn from empirical research as follows. Embezzlement of funds in private - ultimately - controlling listed companies is significantly bigger than that in state - ultimately - controlling ones. Embezzlement of funds in group - controlling listed companies is significantly bigger than that in non - group - controlling ones. Controlling shareholders＇ shares are significantly negative - related to embezzlement of listed companies＇ funds. Other big shareholders＇ shares are significantly nega- tive - related to embezzlement of listed companies＇ funds.

关 键 词：控制权 资金占用 掏空 

分 类 号：F275.2[经济管理—企业管理]