基于产品创新的企业R&D联盟形成的博弈分析  

Game-analysis of Initiation of Enterprise R&D Alliance Based on Product Innovation

作　　者：于春海[1] 樊治平[1] 周文光[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2008年第4期56-60,71,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家杰出青年科学基金(70525001);中国博士后科学基金(20060400291)

摘　　要：针对基于产品创新的企业R&D联盟形成过程,建立了一个包含信任、企业学习能力和技术溢出率在内的博弈模型,并利用该模型分析了不同状态下企业的最优预期利润,最后得出了不同状态下企业结盟与否的结论。分析结果表明,企业的最优预期利润是信任、企业学习能力、技术溢出率的函数,这些因素对于企业结盟与否有重要影响,最优预期利润的不同导致了关于联盟形成的不同结论。Aiming at the process of initiation of enterprise R＆D alliance based on product innovation, we establish a game model containing trust, enterprise study ability and technology spillovers rate, and analyze enterprises＇ optimal expected profits in different cases by the game model. Finally we drave the conclusion about whether enterprises ally or not. The analysis results indicate that enterprises＇ optimal expected profits are functions of trust, enterprise study ability and technology spillovers rate, which are very important for the initiation of enterprise R＆D alliance. The difference of optimal expected profits leads to the different conclusion about the initiation of enterprise R＆D alliance based on product innovation.

关 键 词：R&D联盟 产品创新 博弈 形成 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]