企业固定费许可策略与政府R&D补贴激励研究  

Research on Motivation of Enterprise's Fixed-Fee Licensing Strategy and Government R&D Subsidy

作　　者：赵丹[1] 钟德强[1] 罗定提[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学管理科学与工程研究所,湖南株洲412008

出　　处：《湖南工业大学学报》2008年第4期96-101,共6页Journal of Hunan University of Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70540014)

摘　　要：建立了一个带有R&D产出溢出的4阶段R&D竞赛模型,分析了在固定费许可策略下企业R&D溢出,以及在许可得益上的讨价还价能力对政府的R&D政策的影响。证明在只有一个企业进行创新时,政府不会对本国企业进行补贴。在两个企业都进行创新时,若R&D溢出小于二分之一,如果本国企业讨价还价能力较大,政府将对其进行补贴,而如果本国企业讨价还价能力较小时,政府将对其进行征税;若R&D溢出等于二分之一,政府将根据企业的讨价还价能力对其进行激励;若R&D溢出大于二分之一,政府将对本国企业的R&D进行补贴。In view of establishing a four-stage R＆D rivalry model with R＆D spillovers in outputs, it analyzes the effect of R＆D spillovers and bargaining power upon the licensing gain within firms on R＆D subsidy policy in fixed-fee licensing. The result shows that there is no incentive for the governments to subsidize its firms＇ R＆D when a firm innovates. A government＇s R＆D policy crucially depends on its domestic firm＇s bargaining power over the licensing gain when both firms innovate. There are three kinds of situations as follows： if the R＆D spillover is smaller than one half, the government subsidizes its domestic firm＇s R＆D, while when the firm＇s bargaining power is greater than the other, the government levies tax on the finn; if the R＆D spillover equals one half, a government＇s R＆D policy is also decided by its firm＇s bargaining power; if the R＆D spillover is more than one half, both governments will subsidize R＆D investment by their domestic firms.

关 键 词：固定费许可 R&D溢出 政府补贴 讨价还价能力 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F713.584[经济管理—国民经济]