内部人交易与预售公告制度研究  

A Study on Insider Trading and Pre-announcement Regime

作　　者：马光 孙黎 

机构地区：[1]美国达拉斯德州大学管理学院,dallastx75080

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2008年第9期4-9,共6页Securities Market Herald

摘　　要：本文提出了内部人基于分散财富风险进行交易的动机,并在HHW的理论模型框架内分析了预售公告制度下的市场均衡和社会福利变化。结论表明预售公告制度下存在稳健的市场均衡,社会总福利得到提高;而且,在预售公告制度下,内部人更倾向于接受透明的会计披露制度。本文的结论对深化股改全流通具有一定的启示,建议决策层考虑预售公告制度,以减少限售股大量上市造成的冲击。We propose insiders＇ incentive of diversifying wealth variation risks in the open market, and analyze the equilibrium and social welfare under pre-announcement regime based on HHW model. We prove that there exists robust market equilibrium and social welfare gets improved. In addition, insiders are more likely to accept transparent disclosure regulations. Our finds have policy implications on the stock market reform in China.

关 键 词：全流通市场 内部人交易 市场监管 信息披露 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]