一类企业组织竞争中的复杂性表现评价  

Performance measures of complexity for class of competition of enterprise

作　　者：马国建[1] 梅强[1] 杜建国[1] 刘秋生[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学工商管理学院,镇江212013

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2008年第4期13-23,共11页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70773051;70571034;70731002);国家社会科学基金资助项目(07CJL028;07CJY014);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20060400918);江苏省博士后科研资助计划资助项目(0601020C);江苏大学校高级人才基金资助项目(06JDG025)

摘　　要：为研究企业组织在周期态的表现,提出复杂性表现评价概念.通过一个双寡头产量竞争演化模型的分析,用数值仿真展示了决策参数的大小和初始条件的不同取值对博弈收敛到Nash 均衡快慢的影响.以累计利润为主要评价指标,采用取值方法对该模型的在周期态、混沌态的表现进行评价.研究发现:参与者的最优战略组合位于 Nash 均衡点的稳定域内;累计利润对在 Nash 均衡产量的某邻域内的初始产量、对在 Nash 均衡稳定域的较大范围内的决策参数的取值是不敏感的;决策参数对初始产量收敛速度的影响及博弈论中的囚徒困境问题是形成3维仿真图中坐标轴两侧不平坦区域的主要机制;Nash 均衡产量的实际稳定区域可能比一般意义上的稳定区域要小。This paper points out we should pay attention to performance of economic entities in various period states and gives the concept of performance measures of complexity. After a Duopoly competition evolutionary model is introduced, numerical simulation is used to analyze the initial output and the decisive parameters＇ in- fluences on the speed of the system＇ s evolution convergence to Nash equilibrium. Performances of the model in various period states and chaos state are evaluated in this paper by using performance measures of aggregate profits. It is found that the optimal strategy profile locates in the stable region of Nash equilibrium, and aggre- gate profits are not sensitive to initial output in certain neighborhood of Nash equilibrium or to the decisive pa- rameters in their majority of stable region of Nash equilibrium. Impact of the decisive parameters on the con- verging speed of the initial output to Nash equilibrium and the prisoners＇ dilemma in game theory are the main reason for the yielding of uneven parts in both sides of 3-dimensions simulation figure. The real stable region of Nash equilibrium is smaller than that in general.

关 键 词：双寡头产量竞争演化模型 NASH均衡 复杂性表现评价 

分 类 号：F069[经济管理—政治经济学] F232