创新进化博弈视角下政府与企业的策略选择  

On the strategy choice between government and enterprises from the innovative evolutionary game theory visual angle

作　　者：张红波[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南科技大学,湖南湘潭411201

出　　处：《中国矿业》2008年第9期20-23,共4页China Mining Magazine

基　　金：湖南省软科学研究项目资助(2007zk3084)

摘　　要：创新对提高企业的竞争力,促进社会进步和经济发展具有十分重要的意义。由于创新的风险和不确定性,使得创新在很大程度上取决于创新主体——政府和企业的行为。本文以进化博弈的复制动态方法为工具,构建了创新进化博弈模型,分析了在创新过程中,政府与企业的策略互动及其均衡。本文证明:政府的有效激励会促使企业选择创新,而企业的创新热情将促进政府建立和完善创新激励机制。博弈的进化均衡,是政府从制度上确保降低企业创新的外部成本以激励企业进行创新,企业则选择持续创新以追逐创新收益。Innovation is very important to promote enterprises＇ competition ability, society progress and economic development. Because of risks and uncertainties, innovation depends on the behaviors of government and enterprise-the innovative corpus to a large extent. This paper constructed innovation evolutionary game theory model with the tool of replicator dynamics of evolution game theory, it analyzed the strategies interaction and equilibrium between government and enterprise. This paper testifies that： the government＇s effective incentive will impel enterprise to choice innovation, and the innovative enthusiasm of enterprise will promote government to set up and perfect innovative incentive mechanism, the evolutionary equilibrium of game is that government guaranteed to reduce the outside cost of from system so as to incentive enterprise to carry on innovation, and enterprise choice innovation in order to gain the innovative profits continuously.

关 键 词：创新 进化博弈 复制动态 激励 均衡 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]