不同高管报酬方式对公司绩效的影响研究——基于中国上市公司的经验检验  

A Study on the Impact of Different Remuneration of Top Management on Company's Performance:An Empirical Verification Based on Chinese Listed Companies' Data

作　　者：李燕萍[1] 孙红[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《经济管理》2008年第18期42-49,共8页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目"中国特色的人才强国战略实施与动力机制研究"(07AJY023);国家社科基金项目"培养新型农民与新农村建设研究:基于人力资源开发的理论分析;作用机制与政策建议"

摘　　要：本文以我国股权分置改革前的473家上市公司1999～2004年数据为样本,研究了高管年薪制和持股对公司短期绩效和长期绩效的影响,并比较了两种不同高管报酬方式对公司短长期绩效的影响程度,以期为不同高管报酬方式对公司绩效影响的诠释提供中国情境下的经验检验。研究结果表明,高管年薪制对公司短长期绩效具有显著影响;高管持股和公司短长绩效具有不显著的二次曲线关系,对公司绩效影响较小;高管年薪制比持股更能影响公司的短长期绩效。In order to provide empirical support on the impact of different top management remunerations on company＇s performance in China situation, taking the data from 473 Chinese listed companies before the split share structure reform spanning from 1999-2004, this authors of this paper studied the impact of annual salary and managerial ownership of top executives on company＇s short--term and long-term performance, and compared their impact degree. We find： firstly, top management annual salary has a remarkably positive relationship with both short--term and long--term performance of company; secondly, managerial ownership has a quadratic, not remarkable, curve relationship with both short--term and long--term performance of company; finally, comparing with managerial ownership, annual salary has more impact on both short--term and long--term performance.

关 键 词：高管报酬方式 短期绩效 长期绩效 上市公司 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]