讨价还价模型的并购谈判策略研究  

Improved strategies in merger and acquisition negotiations from a bargaining model

作　　者：于波涛[1] 于渤[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学管理学院

出　　处：《哈尔滨工程大学学报》2008年第9期1007-1011,共5页Journal of Harbin Engineering University

基　　金：黑龙江省社会科学基金资助项目(06D020);黑龙江省科技攻关基金资助项目(GC07D216)

摘　　要：针对企业并购中难以制定恰当的谈判策略和精确获得并购价格的难题,采用两轮讨价还价模型,量化双方对真实价值、并购价值的估计以及对自身宣传、伪装效果的预期等影响并购谈判的诸多因素,并进行推导从而进一步优化了并购谈判策略.结果表明,谈判双方不仅可以通过优化每轮谈判的具体出价获益,也可以通过控制出价顺序和谈判结束时机使己方获益最大化,给企业在并购中谈判策略的制定提供有益参考,以理性量化代替声誉模型中的非理性成分,为不完全信息讨价还价博弈问题的理论研究提供了一条新思路.The authors attempted to solve the difficult problem of how to define suitable strategies and acquire real price in enterprise merger negotiations. A two stage bargaining model was adopted in this paper. Factors affecting the results of merger and acquisition negotiations were quantified, such as variations in estimates of the true value of the target enterprise, effects of mergers and acquisitions negotiations, anticipated effects of publicity, and the effects of deception by two sides. The results showed that the earnings from merger and acquisition negotiations can be maximized not only by optimizing prices in every round of negotiations, but also by control of negotiation se- quence and termination time. The imperfect-information bargaining model was studied using the reputation model, in which irrational parts were replaced by rational quantification. This resulted in a new way to research the imperfect-information bargaining model. Enterprises developing strategies for their merger and acquisition negotiations will benefit from this analysis.

关 键 词：企业并购 博弈论 讨价还价模型 

分 类 号：F270.3[经济管理—企业管理]