虚拟企业合作伙伴选择的审核机制设计  

Examination Mechanism Design to Select Alliance Members of a Virtual Enterprise

作　　者：卢纪华[1] 李艳[1] 赵希男[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2008年第10期1513-1516,共4页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家科技部软科学项目(2006FY130100);辽宁省科技基金资助项目(20061012)

摘　　要：基于项目的虚拟企业合作伙伴选择问题,运用委托-代理理论并引入固定成本、审核成本和保留效用假设,提出了逆向选择下的最优审核机制.揭示盟主根据高效或低效合作伙伴在不同阶段拥有私人信息的相关程度,通过设计相应的审核机制来增强合作伙伴的参与意识和工作努力程度,实现资源的高效配置.意在解决虚拟企业中拥有私人信息下的工作努力与利益分配问题,为虚拟企业合作伙伴选择问题提供一定的理论依据.结果表明,盟主在逆向选择下根据不同信息结构提供的审核契约情况与现实生活中反映出的情况比较吻合.The selection of alliance members of a virtual enterprise is studied on project basis. Based on the principal-agent theory and the assumptions that the fixed cost, costing and retention utility have all come true in the alliance, an optimal examination mechanism is proposed via adverse selection. It reveals that the leader of the alliance has to design an examination mechanism according to enable every alliance member to participate actively in the alliance and work harder for it so as to implement the high-efficiency resource allocation, according to the correlativity of individual information actually offered by the alliance members who worked highly or lowly efficiently. The study is done with the intention of solving the project-based profit sharing problem in a virtual enterprise in accordance to how a member worked and what and how much information a member offered. Thus, it provides a theoretical base to a certain degree to solve the problem of alliance member selection in such virtual enterprises. The calculation results indicated that the optimal contract examination via adverse selection by the leader in accordance to the different information structures is in conformity with actual conditions.

关 键 词：虚拟企业 不对称信息 逆向选择 审核机制 利益分配 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]