银行与企业征信体系的博弈分析  

The Game Analysis of Corporation Credit System between Bank and Enterprise

作　　者：付娉娉[1] 董殿文[1] 朱静秋[2] 

机构地区：[1]黑龙江科技学院经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150027 [2]中国人民银行哈尔滨分行呼兰支行,黑龙江哈尔滨150500

出　　处：《商业研究》2008年第10期122-124,共3页Commercial Research

基　　金：黑龙江省教育厅人文社科项目<黑龙江征信体系建设研究>;项目编号:11514079

摘　　要：在企业征信体系建立过程中,银行与企业的关系在一定程度上影响企业征信体系。从博弈论的角度,运用纳什均衡理论分别对大企业和中小企业同银行的博弈关系进行分析。在现行的制度条件下,企业在与银行进行博弈的最优策略是失信;同时,在重复性博弈的条件下,银行与企业双方的合作可以通过建立企业征信体系这样的信誉机制实现,并在银行和企业征信体系建立过程中起到指导作用。The relationship between bank and corporation produces some influences on the system of corporation credit to a certain extent in the process of the system construction for corporation credit. From the viewpoint of the Game Theory, this paper analyzes the game between bank and big business and small enterprises, based on the Nash＇s equilibrium. It concludes that under current system condition, credit loss becomes the optimal policy of corporation in the game with bank and in the situation of the repetitive game, the cooperation between bank and corporation comes true by Prestige Mechanism in building the system of corporation credit. This can produce a directive function in the process of the system construction of bank and corporation credit.

关 键 词：银行 博弈 纳什均衡 企业征信体系 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]