终极产权、控制方式与审计委员会治理需求——一项基于中国上市公司的实证研究  

The Ultimate Property Right, the Way of Control, and the Demand of the Audit Committee in Governance——A Case Study Based on China’s Listed Companies

作　　者：吴清华[1] 田高良[2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院博士后流动站暨中国华融资产管理公司博士后工作站 [2]西安交通大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理世界》2008年第9期124-138,共15页Journal of Management World

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目<基于COSO内部控制与风险管理整合框架的上市公司财务危机实时预警系统研究>(批准号:70772110);国家自然科学基金重点项目<投资者利益保护的评价理论与方法>(批准号:70632002);国家"985"工程二期项目(07200701)的资助

摘　　要：本文基于我国上市公司对审计委员会制度的自愿性治理需求这一特殊视角,系统地考察了蕴蓄不同代理成本的终极控制人特征对审计委员会需求的决定方式与后果。实证研究发现:(1)第一大终极控股股东控制权比例(V)与审计委员会(AC)的引入概率之间呈现显著负相关关系,但在现金流量权与控制权分离严重(CV≥20%)的公司中表现为显著正相关关系,而其现金流量权比例(C)与审计委员会的引入概率之间表现为正相关关系,但并不显著;(2)给定终极控制权比例(V),其对审计委员会需求的抑制作用,在终极控制人的不同产权性质之间表现出显著差异:政府控制的公司比非政府控制的公司更为显著,地方政府控制的公司比中央政府控制的公司更为显著;(3)即便是同为政府控制者,在其不同控制权行使方式下,进一步衍生出抑制效应的差异,即:国有资产管理机构参与控制权行使的公司比国有实业公司参与控制权行使的公司更为显著。这些发现意味着,不仅一般意义上的股权结构(集中程度)影响着我国上市公司对审计委员会的需求动因,而且施予其法律形式背后的深层经济实质因素,如控制权性质、行权方式等,进一步抑制或激发了对审计委员会的需求。From the special angle of the demand of the audit committee system for China's listed companies'voluntary control (DOTACSFCLCVC), we have, in this article, systematically explored the ways and outcome of the re- sponding, to the decisions of DOTACSFCLCVC, of ultimate controllers'characteristics that bring hidden different agency costs. Base on our case study, we have discovered that (1) the control right proportion of the biggest ultimate controller is negatively related to the probability introduced by the audit committee, but positively related when it is a company in which the cash flow right is seriously separated from the control right (as when CV ≤ 20%); however, the cash flow right proportion is positively related to the probability introduced by the audit committee, but not seriously; (2) given the proportion of the ultimate control right, its restraint on the demand of the audit committee is obviously different when the nature of the ultimate controllers'property is different: this differ- ence is more noticeable in government-controlled companies than in non-government-controlled ones, and it more noticeable in local-government-controlled companies than in the-central-government-controlled ones; (3) even if they are all companies controlled by the government, and if the way of using control right is different, the difference of restraint effect is derived, that is to say, this difference is more obvious in companies in which the institutions of management of state-owned assets participate in the exertion of the control right than in compa- nies in which the state-owned industrial companies participate in the exertion of the control right. These findings mean that not only does the stock ownership structure in a general sense (the degree of concentration) affect the motivation of DOTACSFCLCVC, but also the underlying essential economic factors that shape the legal forms of ownership structure, such as the nature of the control right, the way of the exertion of the control right, further depress or expa

关 键 词：终极产权 控制方式 审计委员会 治理需求 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]