VMI模式下基于供应商短期收益改进的合作激励研究  

On the Cooperation Incentives to Improve the Short-Time Proceeds of the Suppliers Under the VMI Model

作　　者：张红[1] 尹金龙[1] 何海燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院新型工业化研究所,广东广州510640

出　　处：《改革与战略》2008年第10期196-198,215,共4页Reformation & Strategy

基　　金：广东省软科学项目(2005B70101127);国家自然科学基金项目(70272047)

摘　　要：文章在供应商管理库存(VMI)模式下通过对供应商与零售商短期收益的比较分析,从供应商自身成本和供应链合作伙伴两个角度提出,可以通过引入第三方物流和收益补偿机制两种途径对VMI进行优化,并运用博弈论方法对采用两种改进途径后供应商与零售商的收益进行了探讨,以期解决在VMI前期供应商合作激励不足的问题。This paper comparatively analyzes the short-term proceeds between the suppliers and retailers under the model of vendor management inventory （VMI）, brings out that a third party logistics and revenue compensation mechanism can be introduced to optimize VMI through the two perspectives of the costs of suppliers and the partnership in the supply chain. By the use of Game Theory, it discusses the proceeds of the suppliers and retailers after adopting the two methods above, to resolve the problem of inadequate incentives in the cooperation of the vendors during the early period of the VMI.

关 键 词：供应商管理库存(VMI) 第三方物流 收益补偿 博弈论 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]