终极控制股东与治理效率的制度分析  

Institutional analysis of ultimate controlling shareholder and governance efficiency

作　　者：高闯[1] 史宝康[1] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《重庆工商大学学报（西部论坛）》2008年第5期9-14,62,共7页Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University:West Forum

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(07BJY016)"我国上市公司终极股东控制问题研究"

摘　　要：终极股东控制的广泛存在往往扭曲了公司治理结构,中小股东利益更容易受到终极股东的侵害。从所有权结构的视角,对上市公司终极股东控制问题进行系统的理论分析,通过对终极控制股东的形成和实现机制的研究,运用多重控制链模型解释了控股股东分离所有权和现金流权的方式,并且通过股权结构对公司治理效率影响的研究发现,在存在控股股东的股权结构下,无论股权的集中度如何,都存在控股股东侵占中小股东利益的行为,公司治理效率无法达到帕累托最优。The control of ultimate shareholder distorts corporate governance structure because the benefits of small and middle shareholders are more easily violated by ultimate shareholder. Based on enterprise ownership＇ s perspective, this paper analyzes the problem in controlling shareholder of China＇s listed companies, makes researches on the formation and implementation mechanism of ultimate shareholder, applies the multiple control chain to explain the ways of ultimate shareholder separating the ownership and the cash flows, and then finds that the governance efficiency can not attain the Pareto optimum where the ultimate shareholder exists regardless of ownership structure because the benefits of small shareholder is violated by ultimate shareholder.

关 键 词：终极控制股东 治理效率 所有权结构 帕累托最优 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]